

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN THE 21ST CENTURY? (A LOOK AT THE NATIONAL
SECURITY DOCUMENT OF 2002 AND BEYOND)

by

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Grand Strategy for the United States in the 21st Century? (A Look at the National Security Document of 2002 and Beyond)

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The purpose of this project is to examine the National Security Strategy (NSS) document of September 2002 and determine whether it provides a grand strategic framework that can be sustained for the rest of the Bush presidency and beyond. I will examine the document through the prism of the elements of national power -- diplomatic, informational, military and economic -- and discuss how the Bush administration has applied those elements in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Global War on Terrorism. I will concentrate most heavily on the diplomatic and military elements, recommending ways to use bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and expeditionary military operations to improve the national security of the U.S. while promoting international stability in the future. I will also look at ways in which the U.S. can reduce its military profile overseas while continuing to maintain its presence by using diplomatic and informational means and expeditionary military forces to fill the gap left by military units being transferred back to CONUS. I will examine the role that the interagency will need to play in the formulation of a sustainable grand strategy and how the political process and public opinion have impacted on same.

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A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE 21ST CENTURY? (AN LOOK AT NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DOCUMENT OF 2002 AND BEYOND)

In his first four years, George W. Bush presided over the most sweeping redesign of U.S. strategy since the days of F.D.R. Over the next four, his basic direction should remain the same: restoring security in a more dangerous world. Some midcourse corrections, however, are overdue. Washington should remember the art of speaking softly and the need for international legitimacy.

—John Lewis Gaddis¹

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America released by the administration of President George W. Bush on September 17, 2002 caused much consternation and concern among friends and foes of the United States alike, engendering considerable debate within the U.S. as it was closely analyzed by media pundits and academic grand strategy experts. The instrument itself was not new. The National Security Strategy (NSS) report had been routinely provided to Congress by previous administrations since it was first required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The intent of Congress was to force the executive branch to formulate and communicate to the American people and the world the mid- and long-term national security strategy of the United States.² However, the quality and utility of the NSS depends upon “how willing presidential administrations are to be frank and forthcoming.”³ The Reagan, Bush (George Herbert Walker), and Clinton administrations all produced NSS reports but they tended to restate existing positions in tepid, uninspired language that was little debated and quickly forgotten. They were also somewhat arrogantly based on the assumption that the mainland of the United States was secure from attack by all but a few great powers that dared not use their nuclear arsenals against the U.S. for fear of massive retaliation in kind. Nuclear deterrence had served well as one of the primary pillars of American security strategy from the beginning of the Cold War. The assumption that the United States was virtually immune from all other forms of attack was rudely cast aside by the events of September 11, 2001, however.

REDESIGNING AMERICAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The Bush Administration set about a sweeping redesign of U.S. national security strategy in the aftermath of 9/11. The primary focus of that strategy was to restore security in a suddenly more dangerous world. By word, in major policy speeches at West Point on June 1, 2002⁴ and the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002⁵, and by deed, in ordering the invasion of Afghanistan in pursuit of Osama bin Laden, and the overthrow of the Taliban regime that harbored him in Afghanistan, President Bush signaled clearly that a radical change in U.S.

national security strategy was coming. The magnitude of that change was perhaps under appreciated by the American public, Congress, the Press, or the rest of the world until it was enunciated in writing in the National Security Strategy report of September 2002.

In its clarity alone, Bush's National Security Strategy report stood out from the NSS documents submitted by prior administrations. The prologue, drawn from the President's West Point speech, succinctly lays out U.S. national security priorities in three lines: "We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorist and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."⁶ The NSS then goes on to discuss the ways and means by which the Bush administration plans to achieve those three basic ends. Overall, it is a statement of national security and foreign policy goals and objectives equal in scope to NSC-68, the famous classified blueprint for Cold War strategy drafted during the Truman Administration. It remains to be seen whether the Bush National Security Strategy of 2002 will have as enduring an influence over U.S. security policy as has NSC-68.

NSC-68 introduced the policy of containment and set the stage for the nuclear deterrence strategy that was to remain essentially unchanged from its inception in 1947 until superseded by the National Security Strategy of 2002. Unlike NSC-68, however, the NSS was unclassified and subjected to public scrutiny immediately upon release.⁷ The latter's impact was magnified by the fact that it was the first comprehensive written statement of foreign and national security policy issued by the Bush Administration and it was obviously influenced by the events of 9/11. As a result of the changed security dynamic brought about by 9/11, the Bush NSS differed in key areas from those of his predecessors. Notably, for the first time since NSC-68 went into effect, the Bush NSS diminished the role of nuclear deterrence in the defense of the United States. The Bush Administration tacitly recognized that the greatest threat to the security of the United States no longer came from the military arsenal of another great power, but from asymmetrical threats presented by terrorist organizations and rogue states, neither of which were able to challenge the U.S. through conventional military means. Instead of nuclear deterrence, therefore, the Bush NSS advocated a policy of preemptive war against rogue states or international terrorists with possible access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) before they could use them against the United States or its allies. Second, it set forth with great clarity the goal of achieving and then maintaining military primacy indefinitely so as to dissuade and deter any would be competitor from seeking to match or challenge the military might of the United States now or in the future. The jarring impact of this assertion on allies, friends, and foes alike was little diminished by the fact that the United States already enjoyed a level of

military preeminence unrivaled by that of any other great power in history. In addition, the NSS talked of using the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power to spread democracy, champion human rights, encourage free trade, and combat poverty throughout the world. While these objectives were fully consistent with the core values subscribed to by most Americans, and in line with the vision of America as moral crusader advanced by the drafters of NSC-68,⁸ the boldness of Bush's assertion, and the perception that he was prepared to go to great lengths to disseminate American values to other nations whether they were receptive to them or not, reverberated throughout the world.

BUSH'S STATED NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY VERSUS ACTUAL PRACTICE

Because the events of September 11, 2001 served as the catalyst for the National Security Strategy report of 2002, it is not surprising that the Bush administration has heretofore placed a greater emphasis on the use of the military element of national power in its efforts to restore international security and prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. Few in the United States or the rest of the world questioned the use of military force to bring Osama Bin Laden to ground and to eliminate the Taliban regime that offered him safe haven in Afghanistan. Military operations in Afghanistan were viewed by most as a legitimate response to a direct attack by a terrorist group that still posed a clear and imminent threat to the United States. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) enjoyed similar worldwide support and subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks in Indonesia and Spain have only added to its legitimacy.

In contrast, public opinion in the U.S. and abroad remains deeply divided over the Bush Administration's handling of Iraq. From the first rumors of possible military action against Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq, American public opinion has been divided over the issue of whether military operations there were warranted or wise. Many felt that there was insufficient justification for committing U.S. manpower and resources to a war in Iraq, regardless of whether Saddam's regime had contemptuously defied the United Nations (UN) and skirted international sanctions imposed by various UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). Many Americans felt that the issue was best resolved by debate within the UN Security Council and a subsequent international coalition effort to enforce any decisions coming out of that organization. While opinion polls⁹ from 1992 onward showed that most Americans despised Saddam Hussein and would like to see him removed from power, few Americans were willing to support the deployment of U.S. forces unilaterally to achieve that objective, at least absent proof that Iraq constituted a clear and present danger to the U.S. itself. Iraq had neither attacked the U.S. directly, as had al-Qaeda, nor was there incontrovertible evidence that it had harbored

terrorist groups that posed an immediate threat to the U.S. Without such compelling reasons for doing so, many Americans and their Congressional representatives were unwilling to consent to direct large-scale military operations against Iraq.

Beginning with his powerful State of the Union Address in January 2002, in which he memorably identified Iraq as one of three countries of an “Axis of Evil,” President Bush set out to change American public opinion and gather support for eventual large scale military operations against Iraq. By grouping Iraq, Iran, and North Korea together, and referring to them as an “Axis,” even though their association appeared tenuous at best, Bush was evoking memories of a far more integrated and dangerous Axis – that of Germany, Japan, and Italy – and, he was hoping that the American people would support a crusade to remove Saddam Hussein from power, just as the American people had rallied around President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941 in a crusade to defeat the Axis powers. Public support continued in the postwar years, although not without considerable debate, for the effort to rebuild the nations of our former enemies, Germany and Japan, and turn them into useful allies. Succeeding in its effort to remove Saddam by military force, the Bush Administration likewise has often compared the postwar rebuilding effort in Iraq to that undertaken by the U.S. and its allies following the defeat of the Axis in World War II.

While the ostensive reason given for the invasion of Iraq, and the overthrow Saddam’s regime, was to eliminate the stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) believed to be in Iraq’s possession, failure to find that stockpile has led the Bush Administration to expand and restate its justifications for going to war. What it had repeatedly characterized as a “preemptive war” to eliminate an imminent security threat, absent that threat, more closely fits the definition of a “preventive war” – one waged to eliminate a potential threat before it reaches a critical stage. By later characterizing its actions in Iraq as part of a larger effort to transform the Islamic Middle East by spreading democracy and the concept of good governance there, the Bush Administration has brought the issue full circle and tied it directly into the overall grand strategy outlined in the National Security Strategy document of 2002.

Polls¹⁰ consistently show that Americans have rallied behind their president and are willing to support military operations and postwar stability and reconstruction efforts in Iraq until some measure of success is achieved and a culmination point is reached which allows for the withdrawal of American and coalition military forces. What that culmination point will be remains to be seen. The more important question raised by Iraq, however, is whether Congress and the American people are ready to support the larger policy objective of proactively spreading democracy and American values to the rest of the world. Another, more

fundamental question, is whether the policies laid out in the NSS can endure beyond the Bush presidency and serve as the foundation of American grand strategy for decades to come. Is the NSS a grand strategy blueprint for the future that will ensure America's continued security and prosperity while allowing it to spread the benefits of democracy and good governance to the rest of the world? Or, is it the written proclamation of a latter-day Wilsonian quest that like the original may ultimately be rejected by the American people because it asks them to become more entwined in international affairs than they are willing to accept or pay for in lives or treasure?

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

Henry Kissinger contends that as the United States entered the 20th Century it found itself in the unfamiliar position of an emerging world power inextricably being drawn into world affairs.¹¹ The strategic tenents that had served it well during its first century -- those of looking inward, concentrating on territorial expansion within the North American continent, pursuing hemispheric hegemony based on the Monroe Doctrine, and, in accordance with George Washington's admonitions, avoiding entangling alliances and being drawn into European disputes --were incompatible with its new status. Regardless of the nostalgic desire of many Americans to remain isolated behind the two great oceans, its growing industrial might and expanding commercial interests rendered that desire obsolete. The question then became not one of whether the United States would become an important actor on the world stage, but rather what role it would play. Within the first twenty years of the 20th Century, a period Kissinger refers to as "the Hinge,"¹² two competing visions of American grand strategy emerged. As espoused by their principal architects and foremost proponents, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, these visions would have a profound influence on American foreign policy and strategic planning for the rest of the 20th Century and into the new millennium.

President Theodore Roosevelt advocated a pragmatic grand strategy based on the Mahanian concept of great power spheres of influence. His was a "real-politik" view of the world in which nations acted in their self-interest, as should the United States. He recognized that an industrially powerful United States had no choice but to involve itself in international affairs to protect its interests, so he set about expanding U.S. commercial ties around the world while building a naval fleet sufficiently powerful to protect American business interests. He was able to garner the support of a reluctant public for his robust and proactive foreign policy because America's overseas commercial interests were beginning to have a discernable impact on Americans prosperity. In addition, he appealed to America's growing sense of national pride

and honor when seeking support for such grandiose undertakings as the construction of the Panama Canal and the circumnavigation of the globe by the Great White Fleet.

President Woodrow Wilson also realized that the United States could not remain sheltered behind its two great oceanic moats as it had for most of its first 100 years of existence. The horrors of World War I convinced him that the United States had a moral obligation to lead the effort to establish a new world order based on a system of collective security to ensure the peace. In addition, he believed that the spread of key American values such as the universal right of all people to freedom, democracy, and basic human dignity, would make the world a better place. Visionary as his ideals were, they were more than the American people were willing to support in the inter-war years between the First and Second World Wars. Without domestic support, Wilson's ideas languished until skillfully resurrected by his former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The American public was more receptive to Wilson's concept of collective security following the Second World War. That was partially due to the fact that the United States was in a different position at the end of World War II than it had been at the end of the First World War. It had become the preeminent power in the world, not just another nation among many vying for advantage in the international arena. In addition, American companies had become multinational in their scope of operations and constituted an increasing share of the world's trade and industry. Moreover, few presidents were as adept at communicating with the American people and therefore gaining their trust and confidence as was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Add to that the fact that millions of Americans had served overseas during the war and were more knowledgeable about international affairs as a result, and there ensued a climate in which Americans were more willing for the United States to play an active and leading role in world affairs.

With domestic consensus achieved, the U.S. was instrumental in setting up the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the ten years following the end of the war. The American people bought into the Wilsonian concept of collective security underpinned by a network of international and regional organizations because they were war weary, genuinely concerned about the national security in the face of the communist threat, and aware that the United States could not go it alone – it was impractical geo-politically and more expensive than any single country could afford in the long run. While the American people made it clear that they wanted their government to retain the right and might to act unilaterally when American

interests or security required it, they also made it clear that they wanted to share the burden of international security with allied nations whenever possible.

The NSS of 2002 affirmed the Bush Administration's commitment to the concept of collective security, and advocated working within international organizations to maintain global stability while at the same time working with other nations in coalition to defuse regional conflicts. However, the failure of the UN Security Council deliberations on Iraq and the Bush Administration's subsequent decision to proceed with the invasion without UN support, made it appear that for all the talk of multilateral cooperation in the NSS, the United States would act unilaterally regardless of international opinion, when it deemed it necessary to do so. It also appeared to many foreign observers that the U.S. was willing to resort to military force long before diplomatic negotiations and other pacific courses of action had been allowed "to run their course." This perception was bolstered by the fact that the NSS stated clearly that the U.S. would seek long-term military primacy so that it could dissuade, deter, or defeat any potential peer competitor well into the future.

THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

The armed forces of the United States enjoy an unprecedented level of military superiority over any potential adversary, present or future. No other country can field the dazzling array of technologically advanced weaponry and sensors available to the American military nor can they match the high level of training it affords its troops. Unmatched global-strike and power-projection capabilities allow the U.S. to intervene militarily anywhere in the world at any time and in any weather. Once engaged, U.S. forces can sustain the effort for an indefinite period because of the extensive logistics network that supports the combat units in the field. Faced with this overwhelming superiority, no nation has sought military parity with the United States since the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991. In the period from 1991 to the present, only Saddam Hussein's Iraq has been foolish enough to engage American forces in conventional, set-piece battles.

Despite its battlefield superiority the U.S. military does not go unchallenged. Unable to win against U.S. forces in a conventional war, terrorists and the forces of rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea wage unconventional, asymmetrical war against the United States. They seek to nullify American advantages in technology and firepower by fighting in urban areas where the indiscriminate use of firepower will cause many civilian casualties, which the enemy can then exploit for propaganda purposes. They attack without warning using low-technology bombs and the most deadly, accurate, and opaque guidance system ever fielded – the suicide

bomber. Rogue nations, while possessing more conventional weaponry than terrorist groups, seek to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to be delivered by crude ballistic missiles to even the odds against the U.S. Faced with these threats, the U.S. military must continue to transform and become more flexible and agile. It must continue the conversion from training and equipping it forces against a threat-based model to doing so against a capabilities-based model. The U.S. must also still maintain its ability to win a conventional war against any potential aggressor. Currently, there exists no peer competitor with the capability to challenge the U.S. in a protracted conventional war. Such a competitor could arise in the next 20-50 years and it is incumbent upon the intelligence community to give policy makers ample warning of growing threats to allow a shift in industrial output and military doctrine to meet them. In the interim, U.S. forces are more likely to be engaged in limited regional conflicts such as Kosovo, or violent flare-ups on the margins of peacekeeping or humanitarian missions such as Somalia.

Most important, U.S. military forces must be used selectively and judiciously. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are more fully engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are overextended and overtaxed there. Rotation schedules have been extended and recruitment is below the levels necessary to maintain the all-volunteer force and reset units after they have completed a tour in Iraq or Afghanistan. The Army Reserves and Army National Guard have been mobilized on a massive scale and ongoing combat operations in Iraq have caused them, like the regular Army, to institute "stop-loss" measures that place considerable financial and emotional burdens on the soldiers, their families, and their employers. In short, the U.S. Government is breaking its covenant with the Reservists and as a result retention and recruitment are low. Some would make the case the nation is at war and such sacrifices are necessary, although war has not been declared by Congress and itself is not on a wartime footing. The issue comes down to a question of priorities and leadership. The Administration must level with the American people and inform them of the difficulties faced by the military; and convince the public at large and Congress that a nation at war must make sacrifices to recruit and train a sufficient number of troops to get the job done. They must be willing to fund the purchase of more and better warfighting equipment to replace that lost or used up in Iraq and Afghanistan. The American people were willing to bear the burdens in the Cold War because they perceived their security and way of life to be threatened. President Bush and his successors must convince them now that the Global War on Terror, which has successfully prevented another large scale attack on the U.S. homeland for the last three and one half years, will require similar sacrifices for many years to come. And what must the Armed Services do to

better meet the strategic challenges, some known and others yet to be revealed, of the 21st Century?

First, the armed forces must continue their already advanced march towards total joint integration. Because of the technological complexity of modern warfare and the vast distances over which most battles will be fought, no single service can expect to carry the fight alone. The Army must continue to transform its force structure and equipment to make it a lighter more lethal force able to deploy quickly from U.S. bases in an expeditionary fashion. Even so, it will still rely upon airlift provided by the Air Force and sealift provided by the Navy to get its forces to the theater of operations.

Second, the withdrawal of U.S. forces forward deployed in Europe and Korea should continue. Forward deployment, though reassuring to allies and friends, is very expensive, exposes U.S. forces to terrorist attack, and often leads to resentment among the populace of the host nations. The reassuring permanent presence of U.S. troops, even though resented, also encourages allied governments and their people to spend less on their own defense than is warranted. For all of the aforementioned reasons, it is time to revisit the 1-4-2-1 concept under which the U.S. plans and equips for the forward deployment of forces in four locations. Forward deployment of major forces should be reduced to two locations abroad – the United Kingdom and Japan, two of our staunchest and most supportive allies – with smaller units and headquarters staffs deployed in other friendly and secure nations in Europe and Asia. Modern airlift and sealift capabilities ensure that U.S. forces will be able to get to any hotspot in those regions from the UK, Japan, or the United States in time to successfully intervene in any crisis situation. Future capabilities already under development, such as the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Sea Basing concept in which major U.S. forces will be transported, deployed, and sustained for long periods of time from sea based platforms, will permit all elements of the U.S. military to fight in an expeditionary manner thereby reducing their peacetime footprint abroad.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DIPLOMACY

As the military reduces its forward deployment posture and brings troops home from Europe and Korea diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, becomes more important than ever. In fact, it is through increased diplomatic effort, proactive use of the informational element of national power, and judicious application of economic means to influence events that the United States can maintain its presence in the world while at the same time reducing its physical profile overseas. It is through extensive diplomatic engagement that the U.S. must signal its continuing commitment to friends and allies. It is through robust diplomatic activity

that the U.S. must signal to potential adversaries, rogue states, and non-state actors, whether terrorists, drug traffickers, or traffickers in persons that the U.S. remains engaged and involved in the international arena and will use all elements of power at its disposal to confront them and defeat their efforts. And it is through multilateral diplomacy that the U.S. must seek to share some of the burden for maintaining the collective security. While we must maintain our ability to act to protect our vital national interests we must recognize that even a nation as powerful as the United States needs the help of allies to maintain peace and stability in the world. The American people have shown that they are willing to shoulder their share of the burden. They bridle at the fact that with few exceptions (the UK and some Eastern European nations) our European allies spend much less on defense proportionally than does the U.S. and are generally unwilling to commit forces to ensure global stability or even that in their own region unless the U.S. takes the lead, provides the majority of forces, and bears the brunt of the battle.

The military elements of power will increasingly be applied through the use of expeditionary forces coming directly from the United States and/or from the few remaining permanent overseas bases in Japan or the Europe. Those forces will require access to bases in friendly countries close to the area of operations (AOR) and they will require overflight clearances and port access rights to get to and from the AOR. All of that must be accomplished through the application of well established and routine diplomatic practices. To support a new strategic posture that seeks to limit the long-term deployment of U.S. forces overseas where they are more vulnerable to terrorist attack and sometimes evoke political rancor and become targets of public dislike and abuse, diplomatic efforts will have to be redoubled to ensure access to bases for short term training or operations when necessary, and to the prepositioned war fighting stocks that we must continue to maintain in some countries.

The value of short-term training and joint bilateral and multilateral exercises will also increase as the U.S. reduces its forward deployment posture. It is through short term training deployments that U.S. forces will maintain their familiarity with the geography, terrain, climate and cultures in the regions where they may have to operate in the future. It is through bilateral and multilateral exercises that U.S. forces will increase their interoperability with potential partners in future coalitions. And it is through diplomacy that the terms and conditions of those training rotations and joint exercises will be negotiated.

Some measure of influence over the type of equipment procured, the type of training received and the type of doctrine employed by foreign militaries can also be exerted through the effective use of security assistance programs. Managed judiciously by the State Department and implemented efficiently by the Department of Defense, security assistance programs are

one of our most effective instruments of foreign policy. Strong military-to-military ties, well supported by enabling diplomatic activities, serve to strengthen the overall bilateral relationship with another country and improve the prospects of that country's participation in international coalition operations in the future. It would be wise, therefore, for the U.S. to increase significantly the level of funding for security assistance programs worldwide as it realizes savings from reduction of forces deployed abroad. While some in Congress and the public may balk at the cost of such an increase in the security assistance budget, they must be made aware of the potential benefits of that course of action – better trained and equipped forces which their national governments are more likely to commit to international peacekeeping and coalition operations, thereby significantly decreasing the financial and manpower burdens on the United States and reducing the need for U.S. forces to deploy at all in some cases. Some would argue that beyond improving and increasing security assistance to friendly nations, the U.S. must maintain its own military readiness and forward-deployment stance to deal with what they see as emerging peer competitors, especially India and China.

INDIA

The U.S. must work to expand its growing relationship with India through diplomacy, backed by increased military engagement and commercial ties. Through diplomacy, it must swiftly identify and then seek to exploit security and economic interests shared by the two largest democracies in the world. Certainly as India emerges as a major player on the global economic and political stage it will seek to expand the size and capabilities of its military and increasingly exert its influence in its region of the world. That does not mean that India will seek to become a direct peer competitor to the United States. Rather, it will pursue its own interests and conduct its political and military affairs in a manner commensurate with its position as the regional hegemon. In many areas, our interests in the region converge. Those, such as the fight against terrorism, a commitment to the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Malacca and the surrounding waters, and a willingness to promote democratic values and adhere to the principles of free trade, must be leveraged diplomatically to improve our bilateral relationship. Where our opinions differ, such as over Kashmir, or diverge such as over the Indian nuclear posture, must be managed carefully through continued dialogue. We can continue to insist quietly upon open negotiation as the means to resolve the situation in Kashmir. We can and should seek to get India to join international conventions governing nuclear weapons and the means used to deliver them.

CHINA

The U.S. must deal with a rapidly emerging China through diplomacy also, backed by the military stick and the economic carrot. Some would contend that our future relations with China will be marked by confrontation as it seeks to challenge the U.S. politically, economically and militarily around the world. Pessimistically, they see China as a future military peer competitor that will oppose U.S. interests in Asia first and then globally. In that scenario, Taiwan will be the flashpoint that brings us into direct military conflict with China. Such a scenario is possible. It does not have to come to pass, however.

The United States must continue to work diplomatically to bring China into international organizations and conventions that will serve to moderate its behavior and increase the pressure on it to adhere to the internationally accepted standards imposed upon the member states. We must redouble our efforts to get China to accede to such conventions as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and other non-proliferation and arms control agreements. China's much-heralded entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has already shown that its inclusion in international organizations not only moderates its behavior but also increases its active participation in the international affairs in a manner that leads to further political dialogue and economic integration with the other nations of the world. China wants the prestige that goes with being a member in influential international organizations and craves the access it gives them to markets and technology. An engaged China is preferable to an isolated China. The U.S. must focus its diplomatic efforts on not only improving the bilateral relationship but also drawing China ever closer to the international community.

By focusing on shared economic and commercial interests while continuing to push quietly for human rights and political reforms the U.S. may be able to engage China in an increasingly cooperative relationship in which both sides understand that they have much to gain through good relations and much to lose through a confrontational relationship. We must accept that China will compete with us commercially. We must recognize that China will increasingly seek to influence events in Asia through economic coercion backed by a show of military force when it deems necessary. While we should remain vigilant and prepared to meet any potential aggression directly, and make sure China understands that we are prepared to do so, our overall relationship with China need not be confrontational in the long run. China depends on access to our markets and technology along with those of Europe for its continued economic development. Continuing economic growth is crucial to China to be able to meet the rising expectations of the approximately 700-800 million Chinese citizens still living at or below

the poverty level.¹³ China has succeeded in raising more than 300 million of its citizens out of poverty, some to middle class levels or above. The Communist Party will have to focus more attention and resources on domestic issues -- improving the standard of living for the majority of Chinese and eventually dealing with the issue of a greatly undervalued currency before it can truly challenge the U.S. for global primacy. While it is doing so, we must take advantage of the opportunity to influence diplomatically which way China goes when it is able to turn more of its attention outward.

The Bush Administration and its successors should seek a policy of constructive engagement with both China and India over the next few decades. There may be disputes and rough spots from time to time, but we must seek to so intertwine them in the international commercial and political system that they will deem armed conflict to be too expensive to engage in. They, like our European allies, may also come to the conclusion that it is too expensive to challenge the U.S. for global military primacy and be content for the U.S. to continue to act as "the world's policeman" – as long as we recognize their regional hegemony and allow them some leeway in which to act. The danger in that course of action is that China and India, nations which have gone to war in the past, will come into conflict over some territory or issue where their regional interests overlap.

Increasing diplomatic activities to handle negotiations related to base access, military exercises, and overflight agreements essential to the success of expeditionary military operations, laying the groundwork for and putting together international coalitions, managing a more robust security assistance program, and expanding relations with India and China while maintaining good relations with the rest of the world is a tall order and will not come without additional costs in manpower and resources. The number of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and specialists required to carry out these expanded duties along with maintaining other traditional diplomatic programs while proactively offering new initiatives will certainly exceed the current level of 11,000 (7,000 FSOs, 4,000 specialists).¹⁴ The State Department's annual budget of just over \$4 billion per year will also have to increase to meet the costs of recruiting and training new officers and staff, building new facilities and carrying out security upgrades on existing ones, staffing and maintaining missions worldwide, and increasing security assistance and development assistance programs. This increase in foreign affairs expenses will be more than offset by the savings accrued from the enormous reduction in costs to maintain forward-deployed forces. It is incumbent upon the executive branch then to make the case forcefully to Congress and the American people that it is through this increased diplomatic activity that the U.S. will be able to maintain its global presence while lowering its global profile, thereby

reducing the risks to U.S. government personnel and private citizens living, working, and traveling abroad.

INFORMATION: AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

The informational element of national power has two distinct components: one directed at the domestic audience and the other at the foreign audience. On the domestic side, effective use of the informational element is essential to the successful implementation of any government policy. It is even more critical to the establishment of a successful grand strategy. Heads of State and/or Government must provide the strategic vision and then work through their government agencies or ministries to implement that strategy. In the American democratic system the President must convince both the public and Congress that his strategic plan is in the best interests of the individual voter and the nation as a whole. The two do not always correspond. For example, building submarines in Connecticut may be good for the shipyard workers and others in the region whose jobs depend on the shipbuilding industry there, but it may be cheaper and more efficient to have them all built at the shipyard in Newport News, Virginia or vice versa. It is up to the President and his Administration to make the decision one way of the other and then communicate the tough choices to the people. He or she must, in effect, justify every strategic action he takes to the people and their elected representatives. He can do much using the broad powers given to him to conduct the foreign policy and national security of the United States, but ultimately he must have "buy in" from the people if he is to reach his strategic objectives over the long term. The only way to gain the consent of the people is through effective communication. A president, an administration, a government must exercise the informational element of national power to get their message across, convince the public, and gain their consent. Absent that, no grand strategic plan can succeed for long.

President Bush has adeptly communicated his strategic vision to the American people by way of written document, the NSS, and through short, but effective speeches. He was able to tap into Americans understandable sense of insecurity after the events of 9/11 and use that to gain their consent to begin restructuring the federal government and to make sweeping changes in foreign and defense policy. Those changes are ongoing and some are controversial, but his re-election indicates that a majority of Americans, albeit a slim majority, support the direction he is taking especially with regard to fighting terrorism and protecting the national security. The greatest informational task ahead of him will be convincing the American people to support and fund the aggressive spread of democracy and American values to the rest of the world. First, he must convince the American people that it is in their best interests to do so – that it will make

the world a better and safer place and that it will enhance their security and economic well-being. He must then convince them that it is worth the financial and human costs to pursue those goals. The American people rejected a similar course of action when it was put to them by President Wilson just after World War I, but accepted it when faced with the dangers of the postwar world after World War II. At that time they placed their hopes for lasting peace and stability in a system of collective security anchored by the United Nations and other international and regional financial and security organizations. Even then, however, the American people indicated that they were unwilling to support a crusade to spread their most cherished values to the rest of the world.

President Bush must also use the informational tools at his disposal to counter American isolationist tendencies that go back to the beginning of the republic. When faced with dangers in the past, the American way has been to do whatever is necessary to defeat the enemy or eliminate the immediate threat and then retreat behind the protective barriers provided by two vast oceans. President Bush and his successors must succeed in communicating to the American people that those oceans are not inviolable and that the best defense against the transnational threats facing the nation is active engagement in world affairs through participation in international organizations and maintenance of a robust defense forward, carried out by expeditionary military forces. While the NSS of 2002 states that clearly, the Bush Administration's actions leading up to the war in Iraq, and its unilateral abrogation of treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty with Russia and the Kyoto Accords on Global Warming, sent a contradictory message: that the United States was willing to go it alone and pursue its own interests without regard to what other nations thought and without paying heed to international consensus. The image of the United States abroad has suffered accordingly and is at an all-time low, not only in the Middle East, but in many parts of Europe, Asia, and Latin America as well. And that is where the second component of the informational element of national power – addressing the international audience through public diplomacy – comes into play.

Public diplomacy is the means by which the United States, or any nation for that matter, addresses foreign audiences and gets its message out to the world. There has been much discussion of late about the failure of the United States to use public diplomacy effectively to explain its policies in Iraq and the larger Middle East. Some go so far as to say that the United States is losing the battle for public opinion abroad and at home to some extent¹⁵, to Muslim extremists and terrorist groups that are adept at exploiting American missteps in Iraq such as the Abu Gareb prisoner abuse scandal to further inflame Muslim hatred for America. They note

that it is the selectively edited visions of the situations in Iraq and Palestine offered by the al-Jazeera network and other smaller regional networks in the Middle East that are being seen by the Arab street. They wonder why the U.S. Government has done so little to counter that imbalance. Critics wonder why the Bush Administration has not done a better job of explaining U.S. policy to the rest of the world where America's approval rating is at an all-time low, even in nations that count themselves as our closest of allies.

The fact of the matter is that the Bush Administration has not devoted sufficient resources or attention to the informational element of national power until now. It appears to have realized only recently the value and importance of public diplomacy in advancing strategic objectives. It is not alone in that regard, however, as previous administrations had allowed the highly effective public diplomacy apparatus that was so successful during the Cold War, to atrophy from lack of sufficient funding and forced reorganization.

The traditional public diplomacy activities such as media relations, both foreign and domestic, visitor programs, the management of bi-national centers and libraries, scholar exchange programs such as the Fulbright Scholar program were placed under the administration of the Department of State, after Congress ordered the incorporation of the semi-autonomous U.S. Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department proper. Congress mandated this course action for both political and budgetary reasons – they wanted the public diplomacy arm of the foreign affairs establishment to be more closely aligned with the policy making process. Congress also balked at the expense of maintaining two parallel and in many cases duplicative administrative operations in most U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. While the savings realized from streamlining the administrative functions of the two agencies were undeniable, the integration of USIA into the State Department also had a detrimental effect on the U.S. Government's ability to carry out effective public diplomacy operations. Public diplomacy functions had to compete with other important programs in the State budgetary process and often lost out in the process. Programs once adequately funded by USIA became of secondary importance in the larger State Department bureaucracy. Some of these, such as USIA libraries and funding the visits of U.S. scholars, artists and journalists abroad, were either cut or eliminated. It is exactly these types of programs that contribute to a positive image for the U.S. abroad, and give others a more accurate picture of Americans and their culture. These programs must be restored and better funded by the Bush Administration and its successors if the United States is to counter effectively the information operations waged against it by Muslim extremists in the Middle East and other interests elsewhere in the world.

Ideally, the public diplomacy function would benefit from being pulled out of State and administered by a semi-autonomous agency with a relationship to the State Department similar to that enjoyed by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In the mean time, within the Department of State, the public diplomacy function must be rebuilt and the informational element of national power given its rightful place alongside the diplomatic element as an important tool of foreign policy and an essential element of grand strategy. Many skilled professionals who had devoted their whole careers to public diplomacy suddenly found themselves having to compete for jobs across the diplomatic spectrum. Many experienced Foreign Service Officers with little or no public diplomacy training were placed in mid-level jobs previously filled by USIA officers with years of accumulated PD experience. It has taken some time to overcome this experience deficit but the Department of State must increase public diplomacy training programs, as it has recently begun to do, to accelerate the process.

CONCLUSIONS

The National Security Strategy Report of the United States of September 2002 undoubtedly contains all of the ingredients necessary to serve as the blueprint for an American grand strategy for the 21st Century. All of the elements of the DIME construct of the elements of national power – Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic – are addressed in the NSS. The strategic prescription is basically correct. What is needed is a correction in the relative amounts of each ingredient in the prescription.

- The Bush Administration and future administrations should increase the level of diplomatic activity to achieve many of its objectives and raise foreign affairs funding accordingly. It should also increase the levels of security and developmental assistance. By so doing it will allow other countries to learn to better help themselves, and in turn become more useful allies and members of international coalitions.
- The Bush Administration and future administrations must also raise the level of public diplomacy operations to counter negative perceptions of the United States and propaganda directed at it by Islamic extremists and terrorist groups. That too will require more funding and resources. The potential returns are great, however, as the success of Cold War public diplomacy has proven. Devoting increased funding and resources to public diplomacy will not yield the desired results, however, without structural reform.
- The public diplomacy function should be pulled out of State and reorganized along the lines of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). It must have its own

dedicated budget and resources. It must be a separate organization albeit tightly linked to the State Department in terms of vision, management, and policies. It should articulate its annual goals and objectives in a programmatic planning document shared with State and USAID.¹⁶

With these mid-course corrections, the NSS may truly serve as a blueprint for U.S. grand strategy for the rest of the 21st Century.

WORD COUNT=8,007

ENDNOTES

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (January/February 2005): 1.

² John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy*, no. 133 (November/December 2002): 8.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ George W. Bush, *Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1 June 2002).

⁵ George W. Bush, *Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 12 September 2002).

⁶ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1 (or, West Point Speech, 1 June 2001.)

⁷ NSC-68, though publicly rumored to exist almost from its inception in 1947, was not officially declassified and therefore open to the public and scholarly scrutiny until the 1970s, almost 30 years after it was drafted.

⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 462.

⁹ Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 1990-2002" (Quadrennial Series 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002).

¹⁰ Polls show that the majority of Americans back the Administration's efforts to resolve the situation in Iraq, but recent polls by the Washington Post/ABC News (December 21, 2004) and others such as CNN (May 16, 2004, and June 25, 2004) show that a majority of Americans also now believe the war in Iraq was a mistake and the President's popularity rating has declined somewhat as a result.

¹¹ Kissinger, Chap. 2, 29-55.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Fareed Zakaria, "Does the Future Belong to China," *Newsweek* 145 (9 May 2005) [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 10 May 2005.

¹⁴ These figures were given to the author by the Director General of the Foreign Service, Ambassador Robert Pearson, in response to a question put to him in April 2005.

¹⁵ Many journalists, pundits, and foreign affairs analysts have made the assertion that the U.S. is losing the war for ideas – "hearts and minds" – in the Middle East, and elsewhere in the world. These assertions are colored by the individual author's point of view or political affiliation. However, the assertion is supported by the findings of The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World in its report to the U.S. Government entitled "Changing Minds,

Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. The group was chaired by Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, the former State Department Assistant Secretary for Near East Asian Affairs.

¹⁶ Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2004-2009* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, 2004).

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